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FOREIGN VIEWS OF
ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) ATTACK
DR. PETER VINCENT PRY, EMP COMMISSION STAFF
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY
March 8, 2005
The EMP Commission sponsored a worldwide survey of
foreign scientific and military literature to evaluate the knowledge,
and possibly the intentions, of foreign states with respect to
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack. The survey found that the physics
of EMP phenomenon and the military potential of EMP attack are widely
understood in the international community, as reflected in official
and unofficial writings and statements. The survey of open sources
over the past decade finds that knowledge about EMP and EMP attack is
evidenced in at least Britain, France, Germany, Israel, Egypt, Taiwan,
Sweden, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Iran, North
Korea, China and Russia.
Numerous foreign governments have invested in hardening programs to
provide some protection against nuclear EMP attack, indicating that
this threat has broad international credibility. At least some of the
new nuclear weapon states, notably India, are concerned that their
military command, control, and communications may be vulnerable to EMP
attack. For example, an Indian article citing the views of senior
officers in the Defense Ministry (including General V. R. Raghavan)
concludes: “The most complicated, costly, controversial and critically
important elements of [nuclear] weaponisation are the C3I systems....
Saving on a C3I system could be suicidal. With a no-first-use policy,
the Indian communications systems have to be hardened to withstand the
electromagnetic pulses generated by an adversarial nuclear first
strike. Otherwise, no one will be fooled by the Indian nuclear
deterrent.” (C. Rammonohar Reddy, The Hindu, 1 September 1998)
Many foreign analysts perceive nuclear EMP attack as falling within
the category of electronic warfare or information warfare, not nuclear
warfare. Indeed, the military doctrines of at least China and Russia
appear to define information warfare as embracing a spectrum ranging
from computer viruses to nuclear EMP attack. For example, consider the
following quote from one of China’s most senior military theorists–who
is credited by the PRC with inventing information warfare– appearing
in his book World War, the Third World War–Total Information Warfare:
“With their massive destructiveness, longrange nuclear weapons have
combined with highly sophisticated information technology and computer
technology today and warfare of the looming 21st century: information
war under nuclear...Information war and traditional war have one thing
in common, namely that the country which possesses the critical
weapons such as atomic bombs will have ‘first strike’ and ‘second
strike retaliation’ capabilities.... As soon as its computer networks
come under attack and are destroyed, the country will slip into a
state of paralysis and the lives of its people will ground to a halt
Therefore, China should focus on measures to counter computer viruses,
nuclear electromagnetic pulse... and quickly achieve breakthroughs in
those technologies in order to equip China without delay with
equivalent deterrence that will enable it to stand up to the military
powers in the information age and neutralize and check the deterrence
of Western powers, including the United States.” (2001)
Some foreign analysts, judging from open source statements and
writings, appear to regard EMP attack as a legitimate use of nuclear
weapons, because EMP would inflict no or few prompt civilian
casualties. EMP attack appears to be a unique exception to the general
stigma attached to nuclear employment by most of the international
community in public statements. Significantly, even some analysts in
Japan and Germany–nations that historically have been most
condemnatory of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in
official and unofficial forums–appear to regard EMP attack as morally
defensible. For example, a June 2000 Japanese article in a scholarly
journal, citing senior political and military officials, appears to
regard EMP attack as a legitimate use of nuclear weapons: “Although
there is little chance that the Beijing authorities would launch a
nuclear attack, which would incur the disapproval of the international
community and which would result in such enormous destruction that it
would impede postwar cleanup and policies, a serious assault starting
with the use of nuclear weapons which would not harm humans, animals,
or property, would be valid. If a... nuclear warhead was detonated 40
kilometers above Taiwan, an electromagnetic wave would be propagated
which would harm unprotected computers, radar, and IC circuits on the
ground within a 100 kilometer radius, and the weapons and equipment
which depend on the communications and electronics technology whose
superiority Taiwan takes pride in would be rendered combat ineffective
at one stroke... If they were detonated in the sky in the vicinity of
Ilan, the effects would also extend to the waters near Yonakuni [in
Okinawa], so it would be necessary for Japan, too, to take care. Those
in Taiwan, having lost their advanced technology capabilities, would
end up fighting with tactics and technology going back to the 19th
century... They would inevitably be at a disadvantage with the PLA and
its overwhelming military force superiority.” (Su Tzu-yun, Jadi, 1
June 2000)
An article by a member of India’s Institute of Defense Studies
Analysis openly advocates that India be prepared to make a preemptive
EMP attack, both for reasons of military necessity and on humanitarian
grounds: “A study conducted in the U. S. during the late 1980s
reported that a high-yield device exploded about 500 kilometers above
the ground can generate an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) of the order of
50,000 volts over a radius of 2,500 kilometers around the point of
burst which would be collected by any exposed conductor. Such an
attack will not cause any blast or thermal effects on the ground below
but it can produce a massive breakdown in the communications
system.... It is certain that most of the land communication networks
and military command control links will be affected and it will
undermine our capability to retaliate. This, in fact, is the most
powerful incentive for a preemptive attack. And a high-altitude exo-atmospheric
explosion may not even kill a bird on the ground.”
Although India, Pakistan, and Israel are not rogue states, they all
presently have missiles and nuclear weapons giving them the capability
to make EMP attacks against their regional adversaries. An EMP attack
by any of these states–even if targeted at a regional adversary and
not the United States–could collaterally damage U. S. forces in the
region, and would pose an especially grave threat to U. S. satellites.
Many foreign analysts–particularly in Iran, North Korea, China, and
Russia–view the United States as a potential aggressor that would be
willing to use its entire panoply of weapons, including nuclear
weapons, in a first strike. They perceive the United States as having
contingency plans to make a nuclear EMP attack, and as being willing
to execute those plans under a broad range of circumstances.
Russian and Chinese military scientists in open
source writings describe the basic principles of nuclear weapons
designed specifically to generate an enhanced-EMP effect, that they
term “Super-EMP” weapons. “Super-EMP” weapons, according to these
foreign open source writings, can destroy even the best protected U.
S. military and civilian electronic systems.
Chinese military writings are replete with references to the
dependency of United States military forces and civilian
infrastructure upon sophisticated electronic systems, and to the
potential vulnerability of those systems.
For example, consider this
quote from an official newspaper of the
PLA:
“Some people might think that things similar to the ‘Pearl Harbor
Incident’ are unlikely to take place during the information age. Yet
it could be regarded as the ‘Pearl Harbor Incident’ of the 21st
century if a surprise attack is conducted against the enemy’s crucial
information systems of command, control, and communications by such
means as... electromagnetic pulse weapons.... Even a superpower like
the United States, which possesses nuclear missiles and powerful armed
forces, cannot guarantee its immunity... In their own words, a highly
computerized open society like the United States is extremely
vulnerable to electronic attacks from all sides. This is because the
U. S. economy, from banks to telephone systems and from power plants
to iron and steel works, relies entirely on computer networks.... When
a country grows increasingly powerful economically and
technologically... it will become increasingly dependent on modern
information systems.... The United States is more vulnerable to
attacks than any other country in the world.” (Zhang Shouqi and
Sun Xuegui, Jiefangjun Bao 14 May 1996)
Russian military writings are also replete with references to the
dependency of United States military forces and civilian
infrastructure upon sophisticated electronic systems, and to the
potential vulnerability of those systems. Indeed, Russia made a thinly
veiled EMP threat against the United States on May 2,
1999. During the spring of 1999, tensions between the United States
and Russia rose sharply over Operation ALLIED FORCE, the NATO bombing
campaign against Yugoslavia. A bipartisan delegation from the House
Armed Services Committee of the U. S. Congress met in Vienna with
their Russian counterparts on the Duma International Affairs
Committee, headed by Chairman Vladimir Lukin. The object of the
meeting was to reduce U. S. -Russia tensions and seek Russian help in
resolving the Balkans crisis. During the meeting, Chairman Lukin and
Deputy Chairman Alexander Shaponov chastised the United States for
military aggression in the Balkans, and warned that Russia was not
helpless to oppose Operation ALLIED FORCE: “Hypothetically, if Russia
really wanted to hurt the United States in retaliation for NATO’s
bombing of Yugoslavia, Russia could fire a submarine launched
ballistic missile and detonate a single nuclear warhead at
high-altitude over the United States. The resulting electromagnetic
pulse would massively disrupt U. S. communications and computer
systems, shutting down everything.” (HASC Transcript On Vienna
Conference, 2 May 1999)
Iran, though not yet a nuclear weapon state, has produced some
analysis weighing the use of nuclear weapons to destroy cities, as
“against Japan in World War II,” compared to “information warfare”
that includes “electromagnetic pulse... for the destruction of
unprotected circuits.” An Iranian analyst describes “terrorist
information warfare” as involving not just computer viruses but
attacks using “electromagnetic pulse (EMP).” (Tehran, Siyasat-e Defa-I,
1 March 2001)
An Iranian political-military
journal, in an article entitled “Electronics To Determine Fate Of
Future Wars,” suggests that the key to defeating the United States is
EMP attack: “Advanced information technology equipment exists which
has a very high degree of efficiency in warfare. Among these we can
refer to communication and information gathering satellites,
pilotless
planes, and the digital system.... Once you confuse the enemy
communication network you can also disrupt the work of the enemy
command and decision-making center. Even worse, today when you disable
a country’s military high command through disruption of communications
you will, in effect, disrupt all the affairs of that country.... If
the world’s industrial countries fail to devise effective ways to
defend themselves against dangerous electronic assaults, then they
will disintegrate within a few years.... American soldiers would not
be able to find food to eat nor would they be able to fire a single
shot.” (Tehran, Nashriyeh-e Siasi Nezami, December 1998
-January 1999)
Iranian flight-tests of their Shahab-3 medium-range missile, that can
reach Israel and U. S. forces in the Persian Gulf, have in recent
years involved several explosions at high altitude, reportedly
triggered by a self-destruct mechanism on the missile. The Western
press has described these flight-tests as failures, because the
missiles did not complete their ballistic trajectories. Iran has
officially described all of these same tests as successful. The
flight-tests would be successful, if Iran were practicing the
execution of an EMP attack.
Iran, as noted earlier, has also successfully tested firing a missile
from a vessel in the Caspian Sea. A nuclear missile concealed in the
hold of a freighter would give Iran, or terrorists, the capability to
perform an EMP attack against the United States homeland, without
developing an ICBM, and with some prospect of remaining anonymous.
Iran’s Shahab-3 medium-range missile, mentioned earlier, is a mobile
missile, and small enough to be transported in the hold of a
freighter. We cannot rule out that Iran, the world’s leading sponsor
of international terrorism, might provide terrorists with the means to
execute an EMP attack against the United States.
In closing, a few observations about the potential EMP threat from
North Korea. North Korean academic writings subscribe to the view
voiced in Chinese, Russian, and Iranian writings that computers and
advanced communications have inaugurated an “information age” during
which the greatest strength, and greatest vulnerability, of societies
will be their electronic infrastructures. According to North Korean
press, Chairman Kim Chong-il is himself supposedly an avid proponent
of this view. (M. A. Kim Sang-hak, “development of Information
Industry and Construction of Powerful Socialist State,” Pyongyang
Kyongje Yongu, 20 May 2002)
The highest ranking official ever to defect from North Korea, Hwang
Chang-yop, claimed in 1998 that North Korea has nuclear weapons and
explained his defection as an attempt to prevent nuclear war.
According to Hwang, in the event of war, North Korea would use nuclear
weapons “to devastate Japan to prevent the United States from
participating. Would it still participate, even after Japan is
devastated? That is how they think.” Although Hwang did not mention
EMP, it is interesting that he described North Korean thinking about
nuclear weapons employment as having strategic purposes– nuclear use
against Japan–and not tactical purposes–nuclear employment on the
battlefield in South Korea. It is also interesting that, according to
Hwang, North Korea thinks it can somehow “devastate” Japan with its
tiny nuclear inventory, although how precisely this is to be
accomplished with one or two nuclear weapons is unknown.
Perhaps most importantly, note that the alleged purpose of a North
Korean nuclear strike on Japan would be to deter the United States. At
the time of Hwang’s defection, in 1998, North Korea’s longest-range
missile then operational, the No Dong, limited North Korea’s strategic
reach to a strike on Japan. Today, North Korea is reportedly on the
verge of achieving an ICBM capability with its Taepo Dong-2 missile,
estimated to be capable of delivering a nuclear weapon to the United
States. In 2004, the EMP Commission met with very senior Russian
military officers, who are experts on EMP weapons. They warned that
Russian scientists had been recruited by Pyongyang to work on the
North Korean nuclear weapons program. They further warned that the
knowledge and technology to develop “Super-EMP” weapons had been
transferred to North Korea, and that North Korea could probably
develop these weapons in the near future, within a few years. The
Russian officers said that the threat to global security that would be
posed by a North Korea armed with “Super-EMP” weapons is unacceptable.
The senior Russian military officers, who claimed to be expressing
their personal views to the EMP Commission, said that, while the
Kremlin could not publicly endorse U. S. preemptive action, Moscow
would privately understand the strategic necessity of a preemptive
strike by the United States against North Korea’s nuclear complex.
This concludes my statement. Thank you for the opportunity to share
this information with the U. S. Senate and the American people.
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